EDITORIAL

 
   
U.S., Mexico Deepen Economic Ties - Part 2

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By Jesus Cañas, Roberto Coronado and Robert W. Gilmer
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas

Immigration and Remittances
For most Mexicans who emigrate to the U.S., the attraction lies in the higher wages north of the border. A significant number of expatriate workers earn enough to send money to family in Mexico, providing a major source of income for many villages. The money has been flowing for decades, but the opening of Mexico's economy over the past dozen or so years has expanded the ways citizens working in the U.S. can send money home. [3]

Workers' remittances now occupy second place as a source of foreign exchange in Mexico, behind maquiladoras and ahead of tourism and foreign direct investment. The remittances have risen from $84 million in 1960 ($531 million in 2004 dollars) to $16.6 billion in 2004, with an increase to $20 billion estimated for 2005. Two advantages of remittances, when compared with other inflows, are that they have been stable and countercyclical. [4]

Few studies analyze the impact of remittances on developing economies, and even fewer look specifically at the impact on poverty levels. Gerardo Esquivel, a researcher at Colegio de México, began with a look at the extent of poverty in Mexico.

He used three poverty definitions: food poverty, capabilities poverty and assets poverty, meant to be roughly equivalent to extreme poverty, poverty and moderate poverty. (1) A household is considered to be food-based poor if its net per capita income is less than the amount of money necessary to cover basic food expenses. This category included 20 percent of Mexico's population in 2002. (2) A household is in capabilities poverty if its members cannot afford to cover their basic expenses of food, health and education. This applies to 26.5 percent of the population. (3) A household is in assets-based poverty if its members cannot cover expenses of food, health, education, clothing, home and public transportation. About half of Mexico's population fits into this category.

Esquivel then considered the impact of remittances on poverty in Mexico. [5] In 2002, about 6 percent of Mexican households received money in remittances-3 percent of urban households and 10 percent of rural families. Most households receiving remittances are in central and southern Mexico. They are not concentrated in the poorest states-such as Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Puebla and Veracruz-because the costs of getting into the U.S. make it difficult for someone with extremely limited funds to migrate. Instead, the remittances go to better-off states such as Michoacan, Durango, Guanajuato and Zacatecas. These four states are home to more than one-third of all Mexican households receiving remittances.

Esquivel found that Mexico's income distribution is remarkably more uniform once remittances are taken into consideration (Chart 2). For example, over 45 percent of all households that receive remittances would fall in the bottom 10 percent of the income distribution if the remittances were removed. However, only 12 percent of these households still belong to the lowest decile if remittances are included in their income.

Esquivel analyzed the impact of remittances on poverty levels through a propensity score approach that matches households receiving remittances with other households that have similar characteristics. His findings suggest that receiving remittances-regardless of the amount-reduces the household's probability of being in poverty by 10 to 14 percent, depending on the poverty measure used.

Studies differ on whether migrants to the U.S. are drawn from the bottom or top of Mexico's educational distribution. The uncertainty stems from a lack of data representative of the entire Mexican population and inadequate techniques to combine U.S. and Mexican statistics.

Alfredo Cuecuecha, a professor at Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, studied Mexican immigrants' educational characteristics by using sophisticated methods to compare U.S. and Mexican census data and adjust for the U.S. undercount of Mexican immigrants. He concluded that for 2000 the three groups with the highest migration probability were, in descending order, those with nine to 12 years of education, those with zero years of education and those with 13 to 16 years of education (Chart 3).

It is not clear how to explain this nonlinear pattern because wage differentials between the U.S. and Mexico are larger for the least educated and decline with the level of education. Cuecuecha cited the following hypotheses from current research literature. Declining migration costs for those with more education-possibly related to greater English proficiency among the more educated-could explain the larger migration of individuals with medium levels of education. Limits on access to credit may explain why the groups with low education cannot afford to migrate. Cuecuecha noted that individuals in Mexico do not have access to unemployment insurance, which implies that in cases of unemployment, they must rely on the informal economy or their families. Because poverty is related negatively to education, individuals who have low levels of education have too much to lose if they migrate because the U.S. will not provide unemployment insurance either, and their social network has stayed in Mexico.

Closely Knit Economies
The integration of the U.S. and Mexican economies is well-established-but it is changing in an era of increasing globalization. Evidence of deepening ties can be found in the extent and importance of trade, the continued growth of remittances, the importance of the maquiladora sector in synchronizing the two economies and the need to make our economies more competitive through sectoral and institutional reforms.

Mexico's macroeconomic picture has improved greatly over the past decade, but there is room for continued gains from reforms. According to most estimates, Mexico's current 3 to 4 percent GDP growth is bumping against the ceiling of its potential rate. To improve the potential rate to 6 percent or higher, changes are needed in Mexico's basic institutional fabric. More specifically, Mexico desperately needs tax, energy and labor reforms. [6]

The closeness of the U.S. and Mexican economies raises interesting issues, which researchers are exploring in new and insightful ways. For example, Chinese trade with the U.S. has been based on significant cost advantages, and it has displaced Latin American and Mexican products from the U.S. market. Although a more expensive Chinese currency would help Latin America, it may only be a short-run solution. More than half of China's gains over Latin America are based on more rapidly rising Chinese productivity. The international productivity race reinforces the need for regional reforms.

Both trade and remittances have worked to help households near the bottom of the income ladder in Mexico. In regions closely tied to globalization, trade has increased the demand for unskilled labor and raised unskilled wages relative to skilled. In addition, remittances have pulled a significant number of Mexican households out of the bottom 10 percent of the income distribution and significantly reduced the probability that they remain in even moderate poverty.

About the Authors
Cañas and Coronado are assistant economists at the El Paso Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. Gilmer is a vice president at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.

Notes
3. "Workers' Remittances to Mexico," by Roberto Coronado, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Business Frontier, Issue 1, 2004.

4. "Workers' Remittances: An Important and Stable Source of External Development Finance," by Dilip Ratha, in Global Development Finance, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2003.

5. "Remittances and Poverty in Mexico: A Propensity Score Matching Approach," by Gerardo Esquivel and Alejandra Huerta-Pineda, Colegio de México, Working Paper, 2005.

6. "Trade, Manufacturing Put Mexico Back on Track in 2004," by Jesus Cañas, Roberto Coronado and Robert W. Gilmer, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Houston Business, March 2005.

About Southwest Economy
Southwest Economy is published six times annually by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. The views expressed are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the Federal Reserve System.
The point of view is strictly from the author and does not represent the vision on any of the author institutions relationships.